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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to discuss the changes in the tasks and roles
of the Hungarian Military Intelligence Office (MIO).  The introductory
paragraphs give a short view of the historical roots of Intelligence, then
go on to cite milestones of MIO history, and end with an outline of the
organization of the MIO, stressing its strong link to Intelligence gathering
and decision making.
The major parts of the article explain first, how the MIO has adapted
and responded to the challenges facing modern-era Intelligence agen-
cies; and, second, its proposed restructuring, the result of Hungary's
NATO accession.  The concluding portion contains a summary of the
MIO's goals.
Intelligence gathering is old business
The Old Testament Book of Numbers contains a narrative of
description Moses’ sending men to gather information about the
land of Canaan; i.e. the customs of the people, their military
strength, fortresses and towns.
Twenty-three hundred years ago in China, Sun Tzu wrote The
Art of War, considered a masterpiece of military science.  One
chapter (of 13) states that “Intelligence is the most important
branch of military science, because there can be no effective mil-
itary planning without ample information about the enemy.
Organizing Intelligence is therefore one of the most important
preconditions for victory.”
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In The History of the Development of War Sciences (1895),
the Hungarian author,  Oszkar Barczay, calls Ghenghis Khan the
greatest military strategist of all times, primarily because of his
excellent Intelligence organization, mentioning also that this
“important branch of warfare” was entirely neglected in Europe.
A Short History of Hungarian Military Intelligence
Independent national Intelligence has existed in Hungary
since the collapse of the Hapsburg Monarchy in 1918. Between
the two world wars, Intelligence was run by a department of the
general staff  VKF-2 (G-2). Its organization followed similar struc-
tures within the Austro-Hungarian Army.  Hungarian Intelligence
then was largely determined by its first director, Dome Sztojai, a
staff colonel, later Prime Minister.
After the Second World War, before the political changes in
the late eighties, the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff of the
Hungarian People’s Army was responsible for military Intelligence. 
In 1995, the Parliament approved the CXXV Act about the
National Security Services, which defined their legal status and
task. Thus the MIO of the Hungarian Republic (MIOHR) was cre-
ated in its present form.
The law directs that the MIO promote the national security
interests of the country through open and covert information gath-
ering. Its main emphasis is placed on the military elements of
security policy (military policy, military industry and armed forces).
Utmost attention is given to the early warning of emerging crises
in the region and to the events in existing conflict zones. Together
with other domestic national security services, the MIO partici-
pates in uncovering threats to the security of the country; e.g., ter-
rorism and the illegal trade of arms and internationally controlled
goods and technologies.
According to the law, the specific tasks of the MIO are as fol-
lows:
· Obtaining, analyzing, and disseminating information on for-
eign targets or of foreign origin, necessary to government
decisions, on the military elements of security policy,
including military policy, military industry and armed
forces;
· uncovering hostile intentions against the Hungarian
Republic;
· uncovering the activities of foreign military secret services
directed against the sovereignty and defense interests of
the Hungarian Republic;
·  collecting information about illegal arms trade endangering
national security and terror organizations whose activities
are directed against the security of the armed forces;
·  taking part in uncovering and preventing the illegal trade in37
internationally controlled goods and technologies;
· ensuring availability of information necessary for the strate-
gic-operational planning activities of the Joint Staff of the
HHDF;
· protecting Hungarian military organizations, installations
and institutions abroad;
· providing national security protection and vetting of person-
nel under its authority.
In addition to the main tasks defined in the Act,
the MIO conducts acquisition, research, development and
training in the application of technical devices that are
necessary to fulfil its missions and co-operates with other
national security services in this field;
fulfils its obligations associated with the extraordinary and
emergency states as separately defined by the law;
within the framework of the national security law, fulfils the
tasks designated by the Government and the Minister of
Defense;
performs tasks of internal security and crime prevention; and
ensures professional training for its officers, NCOs, and civil-
ian public officials.
The Government, the parliamentary committees, and the state
and military leaders may request special information from the
MIO.
Government direction and parliamentary control































The MIO of the Hungarian Republic is a military-type nation-
al security service; it is a government institution directed by the
defense minister and concerned with strategic Intelligence activi-
ties.
Two parliamentary committees control the MIO and the MSO.
In addition, certain secret information gathering methods require
the permission of the Minister of Justice.
Organizational structure of the MIO
The Director General is head of the MIO. The professional
and support activities are conducted by directorates. Functionally,
the organization is divided into information and data collecting,
analysis and assessment, and support groups.
Intelligence activities are conducted in different, but linked
phases. The process starts with the formulation of requirements
that govern planning, organizing, and directing of collection activ-
ities. The data obtained are registered, managed, and processed
(evaluated, analyzed and assessed) and then submitted to deci-
sion-makers. They formulate new requirements, and the cycle
starts again.
Changes in MIO activities
The changes in our activities (continuous from 1990) partly reflect
the new developments of the last two decades of the 20th centu-
ry. What follows is an analysis of four factors (challenges) that
shaped our profession and determined its unavoidable reform.
· First are the consequences of the social changes that39
occurred as a result of the Information Boom, which
affected Intelligence gathering considerably; for example,
the relationship of modern telecommunication (mass
media) and Intelligence, its competition as well as its co-
operation.  Emphasized here are the importance and
requirements of minute professional analysis of incoming
information.
· Next are the immense and traumatic political changes of the
end of the century, which transformed the relationship
between diplomacy and Intelligence.
· Third is NATO’s new Strategic Concept, and what it means
to the changing roles of Intelligence, especially to
transnational risks and peace support operations outside
the framework of the V Article defense missions.
· And paralleling the changes in the political and geo-strate-
gic environment is the revolution in military affairs, driven
mainly by technological innovation, especially informa-
tion science.
Information is power
A feature of our age for the decision-maker is not the lack of infor-
mation. Mass communication, the written and electronic press,
the new media channels, satellite television and the Internet, all
are a challenge to Intelligence.  They compete for the attention of
the state and military leaders and influence public opinion.
Politicians, wrestling with strategic problems, need Intelligence
support, including military assessments and long term projections,
but this can not be done within the old framework. The content,
the medium, the tasks, and the professional nature of Intelligence
are in transition. Intelligence is no longer primarily information
collection. The flood of information must be harnessed, filtered,
and selected. Useful information must be arranged, organized,
assessed and tailored to support the decision-makers.  The “col-
lectors” are replaced by “finders,” “browsers,” “surfers,” and sci-
entific researchers. This military revolution changes the profes-
sional nature, tasks, and methods of Intelligence. 
· The most important social challenge is how to handle the
ubiquitous “CNN-effect.” Intelligence offers accuracy and profes-
sional analysis as an alternative to the quantity and sensational-
ism of the mass media. A new kind of Intelligence is OSINT (open
source Intelligence), which is a partial answer to the “CNN-
effect”; i.e., the competition of the professional news producers all
attempting to gain the favor of the decision makers. This compe-
tition is won by Intelligence; because of its professional qualities,
it can provide deeper, more reliable, objective, factual, tailored,
specialized and processed information than the media, which are































potentially manipulated. The key phrase is “all source
Intelligence”, which is based on evaluated, analyzed, and
assessed data, as contrasted to the reports of “single source”
correspondents, who provide quick, but at the same time
unchecked and unreliable information. The modern situation
centers of the Military Intelligence services process a complex of
incoming information; immediately, task data collection agen-
cies evaluate and analyze news, register, store, and manage
data, and then communicate on secure channels with the cus-
tomers, informing them in real time, if necessary. These infor-
mation centers are capable of electronically processing and
transmitting written, graphic, voice, photo and/or video data,
and thus provide better decision support and almost as rapid
news coverage as CNN. And this concerns only “current”
Intelligence; other Intelligence disciplines, such as basic
research and estimative Intelligence, also support strategic
decisions with long term projections, analysis, and assessments.
· Multiple and rapid political changes in the last two
decades have reshaped the relationship between diplomacy
and Intelligence.  The result of global and strategic shifts has
been an increased uncertainty in world affairs.  Political deci-
sion-making thus becomes an ad hoc reaction to unexpected
crisis situations; the main reaction of decision-makers is per-
manent surprise.
In spite of armed forces reductions, the tasks of the
Intelligence services are numerous and constantly increasing.
The western countries spend 3 to 10 percent of their defense
budgets on Intelligence. The US and the UK, in fact, spend
more on national security services than on diplomacy.  Usually
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs co-ordinates the complex tasks
related to national security (with the participation of the Defense
Ministry), so the link between foreign policy and Intelligence
becomes stronger.
The British Strategic Defense Review considers defense
diplomacy a new, separate task and defines it as the support
given to foreign policy by the armed forces (i.e. conflict pre-
vention, confidence building, military co-operation, and devel-
opment programs). Confidence building is impossible without
reliable information on the other party’s position, capabilities,
and intentions, as the main source of distrust is ignorance of the
facts.
The present strategic environment provides conditions for
even more distrust. We must be able to manage conflicts and
crises, or, better yet, prevent them. The international communi-
ty recognizes that it needs a bolder approach. Lord Robertson
of Britain (now NATO’s Secretary) called the conflict prevention

























its purpose was “the demilitarization of thinking.”  Although these
are primarily diplomatic tasks, and require non-military means, an
effective diplomatic campaign also demands current and reliable
information, presented in a military context, about the violations
of arms control regimes.
· The main element of the new European defense diplomacy
is “bridge-building”. Recent conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Chechnya prove that security is not guaranteed on the continent.
European countries recognize that their security depends on the
stability of the surrounding regions. Consequently, Intelligence
now concentrates more on local conflicts and matters affecting
regional stability, instead of being preoccupied with “target coun-
tries.”
· Defense diplomacy complements classical foreign policy; it
possesses a well-organized methodological and organizational
framework and has the harmonious co-operation of various min-
istries. On-site military representation may be necessary, and this
may be in the form of a defense attaché office, a liaison group,
or a program office. Military attachés play a key part in defense
diplomacy, for they can assure that the sending country is aware
of the interests of the receiving country. Intelligence is again sig-
nificant, for the attaché offices (representing the supreme com-
mander (president), the Defense Ministry and the General Staff)
are usually run by Intelligence organizations, and for reasons
other than tradition.
The complexity of defense diplomacy demands co-ordination
between the various ministries - especially with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.  Co-operation between diplomatic and military
representations is assured, for the defense attaché offices usually
work within the embassy system, and the defense attaché is the
military advisor of the ambassador.
Military diplomacy, run by the MIO, is only a part of the
broader defense diplomacy, usually providing information and
technical support. 
Everybody working in defense affairs abroad is an ambassa-
dor of peace and security in the world.
·  Defense diplomacy is but one element in NATO’s response
to contemporary challenges. After the end of superpower rivalry,
the onset of new threats, dangers, risks and challenges obliged
the Alliance to participate in preventing crises, and, if they occur,
to reduce their negative impact. To support this task, it is impera-
tive to get the facts first, to assess their relationship to allied val-
ues, and then evaluate their impact on the interests of the mem-
ber countries. Allied Intelligence, therefore, faces the task of
answering these challenges.
·  A key element in the New Strategic Concept is the legality






























operations. There will certainly be a debate on the theoretical
aspects and the preconditions of such activities; however, the
Alliance cannot wait for the outcome of these debates. The inter-
vention in Yugoslavia happened before the new Strategic Concept
was officially adopted. Practice thus overtook theory, and NATO
answered the challenge. Operation “Allied Force”, besides being
a morally justifiable aid to the Albanian minority in Kosovo, was a
most severe test of NATO’s decision making mechanism, the
organization’s international acceptance, its credibility, and mili-
tary-political aptitude. 
This operation also subjected Intelligence organizations of the
Alliance and its member countries to a severe test. Before the
intervention, the situation had to be analyzed, the options uncov-
ered, their impact assessed, and their probable outcome inferred.
During operation “Allied Force” we had to support the allied
forces directly and indirectly, but we also had to analyze the effects
of international public opinion.
The Strategic Concept of April 1999 states that a new Euro-
Atlantic security structure is emerging with NATO at its center. This
is shown by its handling of the Balkan crisis and of new, complex
security risks, such as oppression, ethnic conflicts, economic
decline, the collapse of political regimes, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. It is notable that the Concept men-
tions mainly those dangers, in which case it is difficult to differen-
tiate between internal and external political implications.  This
phenomenon reinforces the necessity of intervention and ques-
tions the absolute supremacy of the principle of national sover-
eignty and the spirit of non-intervention. The Concept underlines
collective defense as the main task of the Alliance, but it adds the
responsibility of defending common security interests in an unpre-
dictably changing environment.
It follows, then, that the NATO countries’ Intelligence organi-
zations must preserve their traditional capabilities and tasks; they
should not, however, concentrate only on military threats present-
ed by selected target countries. They should emphasize more the
events in crisis regions, determining the causes of conflicts, warn-
ing of their outbreak, assessing the legal and political conditions
of intervention, and describing the risk and resource requirements
for a peace support operation (peacekeeping, peace-making,
peace-enforcing). Thus Military Intelligence not only serves to sup-
port NATO defense operations, but can also support intervention. 
This transition from own area defense to crisis management
and conflict prevention in the neighboring regions means a para-
digm change for Intelligence.  So instead of concentrating on the
military capabilities of potentially hostile countries, the emphasis


























and social factors that lead to regional instability and its spillover
effects.
Effects of NATO accession
Hungary’s NATO accession expanded the geographical bound-
aries of its military Intelligence; it also limited its scope, in a cer-
tain sense.  The shift is from its immediate surroundings to the
European crisis zones and to the developments just on (or outside)
the periphery of the continent. This means that Hungary has
moved from a narrowly interpreted national interest to a compre-
hensive approach more in line with the allied requirements and
our own.  Unfortunately, one European crisis zone borders on
Hungary’s south.  Thus, the meeting of allied and national inter-
ests is obvious to Hungary.
Although Hungary is a politically and economically open
country, it is vulnerable to the ups and downs of global politics
and economy, not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but also in far
away continents. It hopes to promote relations with Asia, South
America, and others. But this does not mean that Hungarian
Military Intelligence will also have global outreach (although in an
era of globalization, it must be familiar with these other regions).
NATO, being a Euro-Atlantic organization, does not require that
its member states conduct Intelligence activities outside the
regions described in the Strategic Concept. The direction of
Intelligence is a sovereign matter for each country and depends
on its national interests and capabilities.
Alliance security should also be considered in a global con-
text. NATO may be affected by risks that have no territorial bound-
aries or national limits; terrorism, for example, or organized
crime, the disruption of critical materials and energy, and mass
migration of war refugees.  Intelligence thus must deal with
transnational risks of a non-military nature which cannot be han-
dled by military means.  But if solving such problems is delayed,
crises occur which are usually solved by military means. Russia’s
Chechnya war is the benchmark example.
Military Intelligence uncovers and reports all developments,
analyzes every tendency related to the proliferation, export, and
import of weapons of mass destruction, the delivery means, and
other high-tech weapons and dual-use technologies (e.g., high-
end computers used for military purposes). Also of interest are vio-
lations of international arms control regimes and other agree-
ments controlling technology flow from country to country.
Military affairs (RMA) is also changing, prompted mainly by
new technologies: i.e., genetic modifications, nano-technology,
and robotics. The military and civilian applications of these tech-
nologies are risky, because they are self-replicating; small groups,
even individuals, can access and use them for terrorist purposes,44
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with catastrophic consequences. The biggest trend, however, is the
spread of technologies, which can lead to information domi-
nance.
Intelligence cannot be conducted as in Biblical times, with
Moses sending agents to a likely theatre of future operations; for
there are new, technological aids to Intelligence, without which
the services of this and the next century could fail.
SIGINT uses electromagnetic spectrum to gain information.
COMINT, a part of SIGINT, eavesdrops communications signals;
ELINT captures and analyzes unintentional electromagnetic emis-
sions, such as the electromagnetic radiation of computers. IMINT
uses pictures derived from optical, infrared, radar, and “spacial”
mapping technologies, mounted on land, sea, air, or space vehi-
cles. MASINT studies the physical properties of weapons and
other military technology; TELINT (telemetric Intelligence) does the
same from long distance, detecting and analyzing nuclear blasts
or missile lift-offs. These Intelligence disciplines are characterized
by a high degree of automation, computerization, direct integra-
tion with command and control systems, and electronic commu-
nications. This enables commanders to view the battle as if it were
“televised news coverage.” One application, for example, is auto-
matic indirect fire control, using data transmitted from unmanned
aerial vehicles (reconnaissance drones).
By the reform, Hungary can obtain parity with other NATO
countries’ Intelligence organizations, but it should not be a “copy-
cat” organization. In fact, it should strive to “overtake” some of its
model examples. So what defines national security services in the
NATO countries?
In most of the member states, there is more than one service;
The structure of the system is usually based on subordination,
and not on activity profiles (the divisions are mainly along
the civilian-military line, not along the difference between
Intelligence and counter-Intelligence).
Military Intelligence/counter-Intelligence is always separate,
and directed by the defense ministers;
Relationship between the various services is characterized by
a “community” approach; that is, co-ordination, cooper-
ation, and task sharing. In most countries, co-ordination
and advisory bodies play an important part in the system;
Depending on the constitutional provisions, the services are
controlled by the prime minister or his/her designate;
sometimes, the head of state has special responsibilities;
Parliamentary oversight is usually strong;
Oversight by civilian organizations is rare and very limited.
When national services are run by the same principles, they

























however, that NATO has no “spying” organization or Intelligence
collection agencies. But the Alliance does have an integrated
Intelligence system. How is that possible? This is only possible
because the national Intelligence communities have combined
into a broader, allied Intelligence community, and are voluntarily
associated with each other on a multilateral basis. 
A respected friend and colleague, General Gerard Bastiaans
(former chief at SHAPE Intelligence Division) said that the services
form a “cartel”, an informal association to regulate key intelli-
gence matters and elements among themselves. Such co-opera-
tion is based on mutual trust; its strength is the sharing of evalu-
ated information and assessments. Contributing to this system
benefits all nations; for this is the way to influence allied decisions
and build a consensus view on the challenges facing the Alliance.
The Strategic Review aims at reshaping the armed forces,
making them smaller and cheaper, but also more effective and
more professional. Hungary shares these goals.  The products of
MIO are of a high importance to the leadership of Hungary, for a
rational distribution of the resources is based on long term vision
and the knowledge of probable risks. Therefore, the MIO intends
to modernize, using technological advances, improving bilateral
and multilateral co-operation, and achieving comprehensive inte-
gration within the Intelligence system.  Giving quality work, the
MIO can prove indispensable to the decision-maker.
Creating an Intelligence Community is a future imperative.
This informal body could eliminate the overlapping of tasks
among the different national security services; it would also do
away with possible rivalries among the services, would result in
cost-effective sharing of tasks and responsibilities, harmonize
information exchange and flow, and create a high-level discussion
forum for the heads (or representatives) of the services. In this
decision support committee, run by the government, there would
certainly be a prominent place for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
representing the major information-gathering-and-providing gov-
ernment organization.
Budapest, July 2000.
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